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ABSTRACT 
The article briefly describes the relatively young field of cognitive science dedicated to the research of 
lived human experience – the so-called phenomenological inquiry (or first-person research). It 
enumerates the reasons for the renewed interest in the study of experience and outlines the field’s 
relation to the rest of cognitive science. With the help of an example (phenomenology of thinking), 
the article attempts to illustrate the importance of systematic study of experience and addresses some 
open questions emerging from such an enterprise. 
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Tremendous progress of cognitive neuroscience has recently virtually overshadowed the 
endeavours of other disciplines engaging in the research of cognition. Many researchers in 
the field feel that a path has been opened to understanding the functioning of the brain in a 
way similar to understanding the ‘functioning’ of the physical world. The descriptions of the 
dynamics, biochemistry and functionality of neural networks are becoming more and more 
accurate and through that, it does appear that claims that soon reason will be able to explain 
the functioning of reason are not too far fetched. Of course we have not yet reached that 
stage. Cognitive neuroscientists still have much to learn using the trial-and-error principle. 
Nevertheless, a theory of mind in the sense of naturalistic theories explaining the functioning 
of inanimate nature appears to be possible. 
However, a look into the history of attempts to explain the human mind quickly curbs such 
enthusiasm: a couple of disciplines have cherished similar high hopes during the past century 
and before. The enthusiasm of today’s neuroscientists is similar to the conviction of artificial 
intelligence experts some twenty years ago about their abilities to model the human mind. 
And – in even more distant past – we can observe similar unfulfilled hopes in the fields of 
psychology, cybernetics and, of course, philosophy. 
Searle [1; pp.30-31] describes this sequence of unsuccessful attempts to explain the mind: 
“... The theory in question has left out the mind; it has left out some essential features of the 
mind, such as ‘consciousness’ or ‘qualia’ or semantic content....[Thus] if we were to think of 
the philosophy of mind as a single individual we would say of that person that he is 
compulsive neurotic, and his neurosis takes the form of repeating the same pattern of 
behaviour over and over.” 
A number of cognitive scientists agree with Searle’s diagnosis (perhaps most notably 
Varela [2]): by leaving direct human experience – i.e. the most intimate and omni-present part 
of cognition – out of the equation, we necessarily fail to gain a full-fledged understanding of 
mind. For some philosophers this realization shows that there will never be a complete theory 
of mind, because “the very fact of subjectivity, which we were trying to observe, makes such 
an observation impossible” [1; p.97]. Some try to include experience in their models, and 
some (to be mentioned later) argue that the human experience should be taken as irreducible 
ground by which other layers of cognition are layered. 
There is another, more practical reason why subjective experience research became the latest 
addition to cognitive science. A big part of neuroscience (and also Artificial Intelligence (AI)) 
cannot go on without understanding what they are studying. The task of cognitive 
neuroscience is supposed to be understanding the neural correlates of human experience. The 
question is how it can attain that goal without understanding experience in the first place? 
One could even argue that neuroscience’s (and AI’s and psychology’s etc.) failure to provide 
a full-fledged theory of mind is the consequence of their taking the understanding of human 
experience as self-evident: for a long time nobody (within the scope of cognitive science) 
bothered to doubt everyday intuitions about the structure of our experiential world. Similarly, 
the isomorphic relation between events in the brain and experience (or between behaviour 
and experience) was rarely questioned, at least outside pure philosophic speculations. 
However, such assumptions have been shattered in recent decades by a new (or renewed) 
research field dealing with the systematic inquiry of lived human experience. The following 
text aims at describing this research field and its relation to the rest of cognitive science. With 
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the help of an example, it also attempts to open some of the hard questions that emerge from 
such an enterprise. 
EXPLORING EXPERIENCE 
Contemporary empirical research of experience is, as mentioned above, a fairly young 
discipline, even though it relates to several older scientific experiments. The idea that 
inquiring into the direct experiential world is (at least) as important as the study of physical 
reality is by no means a new invention. Its most elaborate theoretical exposition can be found 
in the work of Edmund Husserl, but even before that, in the beginning of XVIII. century, 
there existed a research programme based on the primary role of human experience 
developed by Johan Wolfgang Goethe [3]. At the beginning of XX. century there was a 
strong surge of new approaches aimed at the research of the subjective. Beside Husserl, 
German introspection flourished at the time, as well as the field of the so-called Graz school 
of experimental phenomenology, which emerged just a few years later [4]. 
Each of the above-mentioned schools soon met with virtually insurmountable problems. 
Consequently, none of them had any major influence on the research of human psyche in the 
framework of cognitive science in the 70s. But during that period (also under the influence of 
the progress of neuroscience, as stated in the introduction), the urgent need to understand 
experience emerged, as can be seen in several areas. Thus a wide array of diverse research 
approaches has been developed recently, directed at the lived human experience [5]. In the last 
30 years a considerable number of methods and perspectives of how to study our experiential 
world have been proposed: everything from strictly quantitative methods measuring chiefly 
the frequency of the occurrence of a given type of experience, to qualitative dialogical methods 
which endeavour to preserve the inner wealth of participants’ experiential worlds. 
The common denominator in all of these approaches is the insistence on studying experience 
as ‘it shows itself’, without endulging in metaphysical or theoretical speculation. Researchers 
in this area emphasize the importance of trusting the participants’ experiential reports. 
Inquiries focus more on how participants experience in different situations and lees on why it 
is so – theoretical grounding, judgements and explanations are ‘bracketed’ in favour of 
observing lived experience. All of these basic research assumptions have been formulated by 
the philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl [6], who realised the simple truth that 
primary human experience is, in fact, all we have at our disposition – there is no way to 
escape it. His motto ‘Back to things themselves’ is an appeal symbolically marking the birth 
of one of the most powerful philosophical currents of XX. century: phenomenology. Husserl 
himself was well learned in the procedures of natural sciences, but he found it unacceptable 
that direct, lived experience be neglected on account of the fixation on theoretical explanations. 
He formulated phenomenology as a rigorous science which should systematically study 
experience, i.e. things (or rather phenomena) as they show themselves to us (instead of 
searching for hidden truths and background mechanisms explored by other sciences). 
Since most of the basic concepts pertaining to the research area dealing with the empirical 
inquiry into experience come from Husserl, this field was given the name phenomenological 
inquiry. As the research in question is in effect empirical, several purist philosophers of 
phenomenological provenience have been opposing this designation. Some of them have 
suggested the term phenomenography, which however never caught on. Another name for 
this research project is also first-person research, a designation bringing another set of 
problems: while the issue in question is indeed the first-person perspective (as opposed to the 
third-person perspective dealing with behaviour and neurophysiology), it is also true that it is 
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dealt with in the manner of third-person research – one does not study one’s own experience, 
but rather the experience of the participants of the research. 
Be that as it may, in the rest of the article I intend to stick to the term phenomenological 
inquiry, while sometimes using also the term first-person research. 
WHAT EXACTLY IS THAT WHICH WE ARE STUDYING? 
If science is supposed to be the study of the properties of the world which we live in, it should 
be clear that a new scientific discipline is formed once we become aware of a new, hitherto 
unexplored area of the world (or once we gain the tools to research an area which we were up to 
that moment unable to consider in a scientific way). In this section I would like to discuss which 
part of the world - or rather which level of reality – should be dealt with in phenomenological 
inquiry. Which area does it actually study and what kind of data does it operate with? 
EXPERIENCE 
The area of our inquiry is experience, i.e. everything that happens in the scope of individual 
consciousness. Husserl [6] in fact did not differentiate between the two - that which we today 
commonly designate as experience was referred to by him as consciousness. Indeed, such an 
equation actually makes sense, since differentiating between consciousness and experience does 
appear to be somewhat artificial: experience is basically the entire gestalt of being conscious. 
The question which part of reality is dealt with in phenomenological inquiry is impossible to 
answer in the same way as in the case of other sciences. Phenomenological inquiry is 
concerned with a part of the world which is the most intimate and directly accessible one, the 
world as ‘it shows itself’ to us. Physical world, human behaviour, social world ... all of these 
are merely different systematisations of the experiential world - and all of them are less 
existentially direct. It was because of this fact that Husserl believed that the science of 
experience should be the basic science, rising above and over all other sciences due to its 
fundamental nature. At this level, there is no difference between that which shows itself to us 
and our perception. It is impossible to separate between the screen onto which experience is 
to be projected and the projection itself. Even the very notion of a reality which is ‘out there’, 
being projected into our consciousness (i.e. the world as studied by most of the sciences), has 
no place at this level of direct access. Experience is the entirety of existence in a given moment. 
Perhaps our area of research was best highlighted by the philosopher Nagel in his article 
entitled ‘What Is it Like to Be a Bat?’ [7]. It is extremely hard to answer the question what is 
experience by reducing it to other psychological notions; it cannot be described as this and 
that. When we speak about the gestalt of experiencing, we are talking about what it is like to 
be that human being (in the chosen moment). 
As stated by Varela and Shear: “In spite of the variety of terminology being used, a 
consensus seems to have emerged that Thomas Nagel’s expression ‘what it is like to be’ 
succeeds in capturing well what is at stake. Clearly ‘what it is like to be’ a bat or a human 
being refers to how things (everything) looks when being a bat or a human being. In other 
words this is just another way of talking about what philosophers have called phenomenality 
since the Presocratics. A phenomenon, in the most original sense of the word, is an appearance 
and therefore something relational. It is what something is for something else; it is a being for 
by opposition to a being in itself independently of its apprehension by another entity” [8; p.3]. 
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HOW TO OBSERVE EXPERIENCE? 
Let us now ask the question what we can find out about experience and how can we find out 
anything about it at all. In considering the question how, we are immediately faced with the 
principle problem of phenomenological inquiry: the so-called excavation error, i.e. the fact 
that the act of observing essentially changes that which is observed. Searle offers the 
following description of this inconvenience: “The very fact of subjectivity, which we were 
trying to observe, makes such an observation impossible. Why? Because where conscious 
subjectivity is concerned, there is no distinction between the observed and the thing observed 
... Any introspection I have of my own conscious state is itself that conscious state” [1; p.97]. 
Our intuitive opinion (shared by several important phenomenologists) is that human 
experience is intentional – it is always aimed at something. Thus when we embark on the 
observation of experience, this means that experience is actually observing itself. This is hard 
to fathom – it appears as though we would need to take a step back all the time in order to find 
a new position from which to observe. A position, that is, which is not a part of the observed.  
At this point, Zen masters would disagree with us. According to them, unintentional 
observation, or rather, presence in which the field of awareness is being aware of its own 
entirety – and of the fact that it is aware of itself, is indeed viable. Who knows, perhaps such 
a state is in fact the ultimate method of phenomenological inquiry? It is definitely a subject 
worth elaborating upon, and even more worth trying out in practice. But that is not the aim of 
this article. Our goal is to present third-person phenomenological research methods, i.e. the 
kind that explores (also) experiential landscapes of others, and first and foremost one which 
yields results accessible to others. 
FROM EXPERIENCE TO EXPERIENTIAL REPORTS (PHENOMENAL DATA) 
Setting aside the possibility of direct observation of experience in the form of mindfulness, 
one must recognize that any perception of one’s own experience is in essence the perception 
of a memory of one’s experience. 
The memory of experience is itself a new kind of experience, of course. But the crucial 
difference here is that memory is but a part of the entire domain of consciousness, thus 
allowing the observer to occupy a position outside of the area in question. Maintaining this 
position means that one is able to observe the memory of experience from a distance and can 
thus try to describe it. It is only at this point that scientific research becomes possible: descriptions 
of memories of experience are the closest we can come to describing what it is like to be. 
All things considered, our position in the field of phenomenological research is not so much 
different from the position of other scientific areas. Physics, for example, is similarly unable 
to explore physical reality directly – at the quantum level one must accept observing merely 
the effects of the processes observed. In a way it could be said that this also involves the 
observation of memories, or rather traces, of past events. 
The only data available to phenomenological research is thus the so-called phenomenal data - 
descriptions of memories of past experience. 
THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF RETROSPECTION 
The processes involved in making memories are of course highly problematic and unreliable. 
The fact that phenomenal data is actually a description of memories of past experience has 
resulted in the formation of two distinct schools of phenomenological inquiry, separated by 
their attitude towards retrospection: one of them tries to reduce retrospection to the minimum, 
U. Kordeš 
228 
while the other one strives to train the interviewer in the dialogical art of ‘cleansing’ 
constructions brought about by memory. 
This school of phenomenological inquiry’s first and foremost representatives are Pierre 
Vermersch and Claire Petitmengin. They are trying to perfect the art of interviewing to the 
level where it would become possible to approach even the memories which are no longer 
fresh, and get rid of the constructions which had piled up in the mean time. The method of 
interviewing used by the adherents of this school is called the explicative interview [9]. There 
are well documented cases of people who were able to remember incredible details after such 
seances (some of which can sometimes be verified).  
The other school of phenomenological research uses a different approach: it tries to reduce 
the time passing between an experience and its report and thus increase the reliability of 
memory. This method goes by the name of experience sampling. It is based on collecting 
random samples of experiential moments throughout the day. The method has one qualitative 
derivation (Descriptive Experience Sampling), elaborated by Russell Hurlburt [10], and also 
a quantitative one, in which subjects are being asked with the help of questionnaires about the 
presence of selected types of experience at randomly selected moments. The latter is 
frequently used in contemporary cognitive-neurophysiological research. 
Both of these approaches are not incompatible, but rather complementary. Approaches such 
as DES are especially useful in ‘drawing out’ a map of everyday experience, while dialogical 
methods can delve deeper into its selected (pre-chosen) aspects. The methods developed from 
the starting-points of these basic approaches have since become quite sophisticated, thus 
objections like “Phenomenology has failed to find a single settled method that everyone 
could agree upon” [11; p.44], which have been stated by cognitive philosophers as recently as 
two decades ago, no longer apply. 
NATURAL ATTITUDE 
The (im)precision of memory is thus not the biggest problem of phenomenological inquiry. A 
much larger difficulty lies in the fact that our conscious attention is very poorly suited for 
observing experience: in our awareness we are oriented almost completely towards the 
content of experience at the expense of its structure. The so-called natural attitude of our 
experience is perhaps the most basic feature of our existence: it is almost impossible for us 
not to regulate, categorize, explain, make sense of and relate experiences into a whole. We 
are used to directing all our attention to the results of this process, so much so that there is no 
more of it left for the process itself. 
That is why training is such an important part of the research of human experience. Many 
phenomenological researchers have noted that humans are very poorly acquainted with their 
direct experience (e.g. [8]), meaning that we are not good at ‘bracketing’ our natural attitude. 
In other words, we are not used to remembering our experience in a given moment, but rather 
merely its content. 
In the following chapter I will present an example of experience research which will clearly 
demonstrate how little we are aware of the how? of our experiential world due to our 
overwhelming orientation towards the what? But before embarking on that, let me enumerate 
some of the basic methodological guidelines of experience research which aim to bypass our 
natural attitude and allow us to perceive phenomena as they show themselves to us. Most of 
these guidelines stem from Husserl’s instructions for phenomenological reduction [6]: 
 focusing on phenomena (things as they show themselves to us in our experience) and 
bracketing. Husserl suggests ‘leaving the usual assumptions about things behind’ 
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(respectively, ‘bracketing’ them) and phenomenological reduction – the reduction of the 
observed onto phenomena as the only thing which is given in experience and thus certain, 
 the rule: ‘Do not explain, but describe!’ It is the single most important methodological 
guideline of phenomenological inquiry. Simple as it might appear at first sight, its 
realization is a complex matter demanding a great deal of reflection and skill. Only once 
we try to merely describe experience in practice without classifying it, giving it theoretical 
grounds, explaining it etc., we become aware of the depth of our need to explain and how 
difficult it is to avoid it. Ihde [4] talks about the problems of differentiating between actual 
describable experience which is manifested solely in its directness, and non-experiential 
elements such as assumptions and prejudice. Explanation as understood here is any kind of 
theory, idea, notion or construction which is aimed at exposing the background of phenomena, 
 abstinence from beliefs or rather from evaluating the ‘reality’ of observed phenomena. 
Without intersubjective verification (typical of the scientific method), it is impossible to 
separate between ‘illusion’ and ‘reality’. From the point of view of direct primary 
experience such a distinction is just one of the ways in which to organize the experiential 
world (and as such of no bigger value than other possible distinctions). That is why 
Husserl recommends that even this – seemingly so basic a judgement – be bracketed in 
order to observe the field of experience as it shows itself, without judging it. 
These guidelines are shared by all the approaches in the research of experience (especially by 
the qualitative, dialogical ones). But since Husserl was of the opinion that following only the 
afore-mentioned instructions one might get “lost in phenomena”, he added a fourth guideline, 
which recommends the search for structure and constant properties of the observed 
phenomena. Husserl believed that this way it would be possible to bring forth a 
‘transcendental’ science – i.e. a system surpassing the unique, ephemeral experience, which 
could extract its essential (transcendental) elements. This is the part where – in my opinion – 
one has to be very cautious. The following chapter will demonstrate the danger of 
presupposing a common experiential field shared by all. 
THINKING – AN EXAMPLE OF AN UNEXPLORED LAND OF EXPERIENCE 
In this section, the problems and possibilities of phenomenological research will be 
demonstrated with the help of an example. The principle aim of this is to emphasize two 
points mentioned in the theoretical introduction: 
 human beings focus almost exclusively on the content of experience, consequently we are 
very poorly acquainted with its structure, 
 many of the seemingly self-evident assumptions about experience are plainly and simply 
wrong. 
For this purpose I have selected the phenomenon of thinking – probably one of the most 
common modalities of human experience. 
WHAT IS THINKING? 
We are intimately acquainted with it and yet (or perhaps, because of it), the phenomenon 
seems to be surprisingly poorly defined. In everyday conversation we use the term for a wide 
variety of experiences: from remembering something to trying to solve a problem. The 
situation is no more exact even within the scientific framework – modern cognitive 
neuroscience, for example, is quite broadminded in the use of the term thinking: one can find 
it in connection with abstract problem solving [12], argumentation [13], bringing forth 
memories of past events, associative processes, sense-making and meaning [14], appearance 
of intrusive mental images [15], etc. 
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The recent ‘discovery’ of default mode networks has focused scientific attention on the area 
of mind wandering [16], and via that, rekindled some questions about thinking. To be able to 
extract some research value from this concept, it is (again) becoming necessary to narrow 
down its definition. In this respect, most authors agree that thinking is some kind of a 
symbolical mental process, associated with processing of content – be it connected to a 
concrete object or event, or to an abstract idea.  
HOW DO WE THINK? 
Furthermore, despite the age-old philosophical argument about the relationship between 
thoughts and language, almost everybody today agrees that thinking is somehow connected to 
language. Most authors do not doubt the common intuition that thinking is actually inner 
talking, most prominently George H. Mead [17], who stated that thought is nothing but 
internalised conversation. This view has not changed much during the last century. Bernard 
Baars, a prominent cognitive scientist, confirms this: “Human beings talk to themselves every 
moment of the waking day. Most readers of this sentence are doing it now. It becomes a little 
clearer with difficult-to-say words, like ‘infundibulum’ or ‘methylparabine’. In fact, we talk 
to ourselves during dreams, and there is even evidence for inner speech during deep sleep, the 
most unconscious state we normally encounter. Overt speech takes up perhaps a tenth of the 
waking day; but inner speech goes on all the time” [18; p.106]. 
Leaning on this assumption, Matthew Botvinick from Princeton University summarises ‘the 
long-term goal’ of thought-related cognitive neuroscientific research as follows: “to translate 




It is interesting though, that Baars’ and Botvinick’s views are not universally accepted. John 
McWhorter, a prominent linguist, is convinced that we are not so much talking, but reading in 
our mind: “When we utter a word, we cannot help but mentally see an image of its written 
version. In our heads, what we have said is that sequence of written symbols. When we say 
‘dog,’ a little picture of that word flashes through our minds, Sesame Street-style. Imagine 
saying ‘dog’ and only thinking of a canine, but not thinking of the written word. If you’re 
reading this book, it follows that you couldn’t pull this off even at gunpoint” [20; p.3]. 
So, is thinking inner talking or is it inner reading? It is really hard to assume that one’s own 
way of experiencing thinking might not be universal. This is probably one of the reasons why 
nobody thought of empirically testing the assumptions in the area of thoughts and thinking 
for quite a long time. The young field of phenomenological inquiry is attempting to bracket 
intuitions concerning our mind’s workings and instead gather empirical data about lived 
human experience. Let’s see what it has to say about thinking. 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THINKING 
Russell Hurlburt, one of the prominent figures in contemporary empirical phenomenology, 
comments on above-mentioned descriptions: “I’m pretty sure that Baars and McWhorter are 
entirely mistaken. Maybe Baars talks to himself all the time, and maybe McWhorter himself 
sees images of written words while he talks (there’s reason to be sceptical of both claims), 
but I've investigated such things as carefully as I know how and become convinced that most 
people (let alone all people) do not do such things” [21]. 
Hurlburt is mostly known for his invention of afore-mentioned descriptive experience 
sampling method – one of the oldest (by now it has been around for more than 35 years) and 
most effective methods of collecting phenomenal data. In recent years, research of experience 
is gaining momentum. Many new methods are being developed, all having one thing in 
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common: asking not what it is about, but how a particular modality (thought, feeling, sensory 
experience...) is experienced. 
Execution of the afore-mentioned phenomenological methodological guidelines, i.e. 
phenomenological reduction (bracketing the content or the what of experience), is probably 
most difficult to do in the area of thinking: content is the very essence of thoughts. The 
predilection of our everyday experience (a natural attitude) makes us pay all our attention to 
the content of thoughts and none to its structure. We can easily remember what we were 
thinking, on the other hand, how this was experienced is rarely observed. Therefore, beside a 
well designed research method, a lot of exercise, determination and mindfulness is needed to 
explore experience, and especially the how of thinking. 
The results are pretty surprising, though. In the area of thinking, Hurlburt et al. showed that the 
experiential modality of inner speech occurs in 26 % of all samples, with “large individual 
differences: some subjects never experienced inner speech; other subjects experienced inner speech 
in as many as 75 % of their samples. The median percentage across subjects was 20 %” [21]. 
Inner speech has been shown to be a robust phenomenon, but far from being the only way of 
how people think: “... some people talk to themselves a lot, some never, some occasionally” [21]. 
Furthermore, it seems that – behind the interface of well coordinated external communication 
– there is a vast variety of experiences, all called ‘thinking’. Hurlburt reports on different 
other modalities of thought, one of which is, for example, the so called unsymbolised 
thinking, which is quite interesting in light of old philosophical debates about the possibility 
of such a way of thinking.  
Many other modalities of thinking have been detected. I intend to dedicate the rest of this 
article to one of them: visual thinking. 
VISUAL THINKING 
This modality of experience is most clearly and convincingly reported in the works of 
Temple Grandin – publicist, academic and well known spokeswoman for people with the 
autistic spectrum disorder. At some point in her struggle to co-exist and communicate in 
‘normal’ social surrounding, she discovered to her surprise that a great deal of her troubles 
originates in the fact, that – in order to be able to communicate – she has to constantly 
translate her way of experiencing the world. She found out that this seems to be a common 
problem of many people with autistic disorders. Following this observation, she started an 
inquiry that resulted in the articulation of three different specialized autistic/Asperger 
cognitive types: “(i) visual thinkers such as I who are often poor at algebra, (ii) pattern 
thinkers such as Daniel Tammet who excel in math and music but may have problems with 
reading or writing composition, and (iii) verbal specialists who are good at talking and 
writing but they lack visual skills” [22]. 
In her reports, Grandin offers a unique insight into the experience of a full-fledged visual 
thinker. She does not experience thinking as a linear (or consequential) affair. And she 
certainly does not think by talking to herself. Most of her experience consists of browsing 
through vivid recollections of pictures of (actual) things. 
The simplest example is her report on deciphering words, describing generalized entities: “If 
you say the word ‘butterfly’, the first picture I see is butterflies in my childhood backyard. 
The next image is metal decorative butterflies that people decorate the outside of their houses 
with and the third image is some butterflies I painted on a piece of plywood when I was in 
graduate school. Then my mind gets off the subject and I see a butterfly cut of chicken that 
was served at a fancy restaurant approximately 3 days ago.” [22]. 
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It seems that she is not utterly unfamiliar with inner speech. But it only plays a role of a 
narrator, without having any power of abstraction or leading the argumentative process. Her 
experience handles what we know as logic and abstraction “with high-speed handling of 
hundreds of ‘graphics’ files”. 
Grandin reports about her struggle to grasp the idea of abstraction: at first, whenever the certain 
non-actual thing was mentioned, a series of all pictures pertaining to it rushed through her 
experience. It took her decades to invent a way of dealing with this flood of actual memories. 
Today, she normally just chooses a couple of the last (or most prominent) images, as 
described in the ‘butterfly’ example, using it as a sort of representation of the whole class. 
Still, she is unfamiliar with the experience of concept as something containing information 
about all the members. Her way of forming a concept is to sort the many specific photo-
realistic pictures she has stored in her memory into categories. To form concepts “I sort 
pictures into categories similar to computer files. To form the concept of orange, I see many 
different orange objects, such as oranges, pumpkins, orange juice and marmalade” [22]. 
“When I was a child, I categorized dogs from cats by sorting the animals by size. All the dogs 
in our neighbourhood were large until our neighbours got a Dachshund. I remember looking 
at the small dog and trying to figure out why she was not a cat. I had to find a visual feature 
that she shared with big dogs. I had to create a new category in my mind to differentiate. All 
dogs, no matter how big or small, have the same nose shape. My concept is sensory based, 
not word based. Other ways of sensory-based categorization would be sound (barking or 
meowing) or smell.” [22]. 
THE ENCOUNTER OF FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVES 
It is not the aim of this article to explore visual thinking in further detail. I hope this short 
overview managed to point at the vast and mostly unexplored territory of human experience. 
It appears that some of the assumptions about human experience that most cognitive 
scientists (as well as philosophers) have been taking for granted, will have to be re-evaluated. 
One of them being the supposition that the smoothly coordinated dance of human 
communication means that the actors are sharing not only behaviour but also experiences. 
Instead with the conclusion, let me finish with some interesting questions that arise from 
this observation. 
From the afore-mentioned example, it seems quite likely that there are different types of 
thinkers. All the phenomenological research on the subject shows that individual experiences 
of the phenomenon called thinking might differ dramatically and profoundly.  
Assuming that there are certain cognitive processes that are experienced differently (i.e. are not 
phenomenologicaly intersubjective) the question arises: do they therefore produce different 
patterns of neuronal activities? In other words: do they have different physiological correlates? 
Let us assume that we would be able to identify a number of groups of subjects that experience 
the same cognitive phenomenon distinctly different. Would they – performing the same 
cognitive task – exhibit different patterns of neuronal activation? If that assumption is correct, 
then we would have to change our ways of research in cognitive neuroscience. This would mean, 
for example, that experiments would have to start with a phenomenological scan of the involved 
subjects, determining whether the person in question is i.e. a type A or a type B thinker ... 
But the real epistemological problem would arise in the alternative case – if people with clearly 
different experiences would produce same patterns of neuronal activations. Such results 
would endanger our very basic assumption: that neural dynamics correlates to experience. 
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MIŠLJENJE O ISKUSTVU, 
ISKUSTVO MIŠLJENJA 
U. Kordeš 
Pedagoški fakultet, Sveučilište u Ljubljani 
Ljubljana, Slovenija 
SAŽETAK 
Rad ukratko opisuje relativno mladu disciplinu kognitivne znanosti posvećene istraživanju iskustva živih ljudi – 
fenomenološki uvid (ili istraživanje prvog lica). Pobrojani su razlozi obnovljenog interesa za proučavanje 
iskustva i naznačene relacije te discipline s ostalom kognitivnom znanosti. Služeći se primjerom  
(fenomenologija mišljenja), članak nastoji ilustrirati značenje sustavnog proučavanja iskustva i postaviti neka 
pitanja koja izviru iz takvog poduhvata. 
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